

The Second Colonial Occupation

**Development Planning,
Agriculture, and the Legacies
of British Rule in Nigeria**

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LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books

An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
www.rowman.com

Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Ukelina, Bekeh Utietiang, author.

Title: The second colonial occupation : development planning and the legacies of British colonial rule in Nigeria / Bekeh Utietiang Ukelina.

Description: Lanham : Lexington Books, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2017027726 (print) | LCCN 2017028560 (ebook) | ISBN 9781498529259 (Electronic) | ISBN 9781498529242 (cloth : alk. paper)

Subjects: LCSH: Economic development--Nigeria--History. | Nigeria--Colonial influence. | Nigeria--Economic conditions. | Nigeria--Social conditions.

Classification: LCC HC1055 (ebook) | LCC HC1055 .U44 2017 (print) | DDC 338.9667--dc23

LC record available at <https://lccn.loc.gov/2017027726>

∞™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

For Mum & Dad
Dorothy Ukege Agba & Celsus Ukelina Utietiang
On your 50th Wedding Anniversary
(December 3, 2016)

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List of Abbreviations

CDC	Colonial Development Corporation
CD&W	Colonial Development and Welfare
CEAC	Colonial Economic Advisory Committee
CIS	Center for International Studies
CO	Colonial Office
CSG	Chief Secretary to the Government
DFP	Director of Food Production
HMSO	Her Majesty Stationery Office
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JPC	Joint Planning Committee
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NAP	Niger Agricultural Development Project, Mokwa
NCG	Nigerian Central Government
NEC	National Executive Council
NRG	Northern Regional Government
OFC	Overseas Food Corporation
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
S of S	Secretary of State for the Colonies
U.S.	United States

Acknowledgments

In the fall of 2009, I took a seminar on “New British Imperial History” with Dr. Joseph Morgan Hodge at West Virginia University, Morgantown. As part of the seminar, I reviewed his book, “Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism.” This book and my subsequent discussions with him sparked my interest in development history. When in 2010, I witnessed the crisis of development in the old neighborhood I grew up, I knew who to talk with. My numerous conversations with Joseph Hodge and a long list of readings on development history he gave me, opened to me a new field of historical research. Dr. Robert Maxon, the Co-Chair of my dissertation committee is a scholarly father to me. He will always be *Mwalimu* to me. He painstakingly read the initial drafts of this work, offered suggestions on sharpening the analysis, most especially in the economic perspective. I will always be grateful to Hodge and Maxon.

Research for this book was done in archives in the United States, Britain, and Nigeria. I am grateful to all the tireless staff of these archives who helped me. This research was made possible through fellowships and grants from West Virginia University’s history department and the Eberly School of Arts and Sciences. My thanks to Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, the former department chair for all the support I received for this research.

The ideas and suggestions of other scholars have helped shaped my work. John Lonsdale’s works on the British empire and the concept of the “second colonial occupation” he coined with D.A. Low provoked me to think of late colonial development in a new light. Funso Afolayan did a thorough review of this book and provided feedback that helped improve the central argument in the book. My special thanks to T. Omega Arthur for reading the first draft of this book and offering insightful suggestions and to Dan Weimer for his encouragements throughout the revision process.

I am grateful to my editors at Lexington Books: Kathryn Tafelski, Madhumitha Koduvalli, and Emily Roderick. Special thanks go to my copyeditor, Sarah Chalmers. I wish to also thank Prince Cletus Ekanem who worked with my brother, Unimke, to design the cover art for this book.

My final thanks go to my family and friends. I owe you a great deal for your love and support throughout this process. Thank you for being there for me!

Preface

In the summer of 2010 I visited the old neighborhood where I grew up. It is located in a little town called Obudu in the southern part of Nigeria. After graduating high school in 1995, I moved away to attend college. Around the same time, my parents relocated to the countryside to take care of my grandmother whose health was failing in her advanced age. As years went by, I heard from family members that our old neighborhood in Obudu was undergoing rapid changes. During my childhood, the neighborhood had been primarily composed of educated middle-class families. We had two elementary schools and two secondary schools only a few blocks from each other. These were by all accounts excellent public schools, and I believe that I received a very good education. The imageries perpetuated in Western media, of Africa as poor, hungry, backward, and without public infrastructure/ utilities was not what I experienced growing up. We had running water, constant electricity, landline phones, paved roads, televisions and radios, etc. Many families, including mine, owned a car and were never hungry. The children I studied with in grade school were clean, intelligent, and well nourished.

During a visit to Nigeria in 2010 from the United States, I decided to return to this formative place. What I encountered was a different reality from what I had known. The changes I had been told about did not prepare me for what I encountered. The whole area had undergone dilapidation. The schools had deteriorated and were now failing, there was no running water, electricity was at best erratic, and unplanned houses were squeezed into every available space. It now looked like a slum. What I also discovered was that this problem was not unique or confined to my old neighborhood. With a few exceptions, it was now a national problem. While I wept for my old neighborhood, I was left with the question: What happened? How did we get here? How can

history help us understand what happened to Nigeria's development? These questions evoked my "historical turn," the point at which I decided to look back and find out how "development" came about in the first place, and its roots in the specific case of Nigeria. History became a tool for looking at the past to find answers to the present development crisis in Nigeria.

Introduction

Nigeria has undergone several phases of development, both in the precolonial and colonial period. In the early years of European encounters with the people of Nigeria, their interactions were restricted to the “water edge.”¹ What pushed these encounters beyond the water edge and enabled the exploration of the interior were the technological advances that had taken place in Europe as a result of the Industrial Revolution. These developments in Europe became a catalyst for Europeans seeking to exercise dominance over vast regions of Africa, expressions of control that would metamorphose from the economic arena to political control as well. European nations now bestowed upon themselves the power to control and determine the future of African nations in both the economic and political spheres.

NIGERIA’S ECONOMY: BEFORE AND DURING COLONIAL RULE

Prior to colonial rule, Nigeria was linked to the world market through slavery and agricultural production. After slavery ended, agricultural products became the major export from Nigeria. The four main exports were palm oil, cocoa, cotton, and groundnuts. In 1806, West Africa (which includes present-day Nigeria) provided 150 tons of palm oil to Liverpool annually. By 1839, Britain was receiving 13,000 tons of palm oil annually, with the main supply from the Niger Delta Protectorate. Palm oil supply reached a peak of about 30,000 tons in 1855 and remained an important export commodity thereafter.² Michael Crowder notes that “[i]n 1908, exports were valued at £3,094,175 as compared with £4,320,000 in 1910, whilst the figures for imports were respectively £3,076,309 and £5,122,000. Exports consisted mainly of palm

products.”³ Originally, palm trees in Nigeria grew in the wild and Nigerians were able to harvest the fruits and produce the oil that for many years serviced European industries. By the middle of the 1920s, steps were taken by the British government in West Africa to secure and improve production. This new direction in the production and export of palm products was in response to the greater competition that was coming from East Asia and the Belgian Congo.⁴ To facilitate an increased production, the United Africa Company donated 250 hand press machines to the farmers.⁵ These were to expedite the processing of the palm fruit.

Another major export from Nigeria was cocoa. This was first introduced to Nigeria at the end of the nineteenth century and soon became the major source of income for many farmers in the southern part of Nigeria. During the Great Depression, the price of cocoa fell drastically and many farmers abandoned cocoa farming. In addition to the economic depression, the swollen shoot and black pod diseases infected the crop. In 1944, the British West African governments opened a research institute called the West African Cocoa Research Institute at New Tafo, Ghana to deal with cocoa diseases.⁶ A substation of this institute was established in Ibadan, Nigeria in 1950. Given that cocoa was a major export from Nigeria, it was important to establish a research center to study diseases that affected production and to mitigate them. This research institute was used for investigations and trials with the goal of improving cocoa production.

Cotton and groundnuts were the other major agricultural products exported from Nigeria in this period. Though cotton had been grown in Nigeria for centuries, commercial growing only began in the first decade of the twentieth century. The British Cotton Growing Association, as well as some trading firms such as the Messrs. Elder Dempster & Co., encouraged this. This company bought seeds from New Orleans and distributed them to farmers in Nigeria.⁷ Groundnuts were cultivated in the northern part of Nigeria in the precolonial times, but it was only after 1900 that it became an important cash crop.⁸ The colonial government distributed groundnut seeds free to farmers.⁹

The expansion of cash crop production in Nigeria by peasant¹⁰ farmers was important to the British colonial administration because they saw trade as a necessary instrument for the implementation of its “Dual Mandate.”¹¹ The establishment of foreign-owned plantations was discouraged because colonial agricultural policy was not geared toward the expansion of plantation agriculture due to Nigeria’s land tenure system.¹² At this time, land was communally owned and adult males were guaranteed access to it for farming. The introduction of plantation agriculture would have meant removing land from the community and placing it in the hands of private companies. The question then is, if trade in agricultural products was a vital component of colonial rule, why did the British not introduce plantation agriculture? Anne

Phillips in her book, *The Enigma of Colonialism*, puts it succinctly: “If colonialism was a project of capitalist expansion, then in Africa it significantly failed in its task.”¹³ She argues that the contradictions of colonial power are rooted in the makeshift character of British rule due to the constraints that were created by the local conditions. Initially, the British wanted to move toward a capitalist market in land and labor, but they retreated because of the resistance and turmoil this stirred up. The political weakness of the colonial state meant that it lacked the power to directly coerce labor and it had to form alliances with local chiefs:

as the only reliable guarantors of labour, which in turn dictated the terms on which colonialism operated. The recurrent problems of land and labour revolved around this alliance with chiefs. Free access to land precluded the formation of a landless proletariat, and was ensured by relations of communal land tenure which installed the chiefs as agents of political order.¹⁴

This, Phillips argues, curtailed the power of the colonial state to alienate land for large industrial agricultural plantations. These local conditions forced the British to take the path of peasant production.¹⁵ The stability and security of the colonial state depended on the cooperation of local rulers and the authority of these rulers rested in their ability to control both land and labor. Therefore, the local chiefs exercised control over land as they had over labor. By allowing big industrial agricultural corporations to expand, the British would have undermined the indigenous authority on which the colonial state itself ultimately rested.¹⁶

Up until the early twentieth century, the expansion of cash crop production and trade in West Africa was largely a spontaneous process of the expansion of capitalist market forces. Thus, farmers in Western Nigeria and Southern Ghana began the planting of cocoa not because they were directed or encouraged to do so, but because they saw the market profitability potentials of this new crop. It was a conscious economic decision on the part of these farmers. Similarly, the colonial state’s ideologies of “Dual mandate” and “Indirect Rule,” and the decision to consciously block plantation agriculture and large-scale farming in lieu of peasant farming under the tutelage of local rulers, were an intentional practice of development that Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton call a “doctrine of development.”¹⁷ They argue that the immanent process of development could be both constructive and destructive, for example, in the expansion of capitalist market forces. They do make a distinction between this process and the practice of development that arose as an intentional or conscious attempt by the state to intervene in market forces in order to deal with crises that will inevitably occur, such as the Great Depression or, more precisely, the problem of surplus labor due to unemployment

and underemployment. The state becomes the trustee of development in order to respond to a perceived lack of the same. For Cowen and Shenton, development is different from natural progress. They write, "Development was the means by which progress might be ordered but it was not the idea of progress itself . . . the idea of development as an immanent process did not necessarily rest, as did the idea of progress, upon a conviction that the future would be an improvement upon the past."¹⁸ If development always connoted natural progress, one would expect that the Obudu neighborhood discussed in the preface would be more advanced today than it was in the 1980s. Yet, the economic forces that have afflicted the country since the late 1980s have actually led to retrogression rather than progress. In this book, development is defined as intentional interventions directed by the state, with the goal of ordering progress toward an ideological end. These interventions do not happen by accident. The state intentionally intervenes because it has seen a need and its goal is to order society toward a certain goal. A good example of such interventions in colonial Africa was in the period after the Great Depression. Suffice it to state that such interventions have continued in the postcolonial period in response to Africa's poverty.

NIGERIA AFTER THE GREAT DEPRESSION

The period between 1940 and 1960 marked a high point in the practice of colonial development in Africa. David Low and John Lonsdale aptly describe this period as the "Second Colonial Occupation."¹⁹ Colonies that had suffered many years of neglect were now seeing renewed efforts by both Britain and France to build infrastructure and prime the production sector. Though Joseph Chamberlain had argued since the 1890s that Britain had a responsibility to invest in its colonies, it took the Great Depression and the postwar economic crisis to move Britain in this direction. While the idea of empire had started waning in the period before World War II, there was new eagerness on the part of Britain and France to maintain their imperial holdings as these were considered essential to postwar economic recovery. The policies and programs that would constitute the bulk of the "Second Colonial Occupation" received their imprimatur in the period during the Great Depression when the colonial governments were grappling with the impact of this crisis on the colonial people.

In Nigeria, the British colonial government introduced significant policy changes in response to the Great Depression. For example, prior to the economic depression of 1929, the colonial government in Northern Nigeria was able to balance its budget through revenues derived from agricultural products and tin mining. These two industries were adversely affected by the

economic slump. The decline in worldwide demand for agricultural products led to falling crop prices. The colonial state had to engage in severe economic adjustment policies to keep the budgets balanced. As Moses Ochonu notes, rather than the colonial state dealing with the problems resulting from the Depression by introducing a Keynesian economic model,²⁰ it engaged in strict austerity measures such as cutting down on public works projects, increasing taxation, enforcing high crop production, making pay cuts, retrenching workers, and introducing protectionist policies.²¹

In response to the Great Depression and the global geopolitics of the 1930s, the colonial government made three primary policy changes that had a significant impact on agricultural production and development in Nigeria.²² The first was the establishment of government marketing boards in 1939 and 1940. The genesis of these boards was the realignment of the world market due to World War II. During the war, Britain took steps to prevent the export of Nigerian goods to the Germans and their allies and to only allow imports to Nigeria from Britain and its allies. A number of European markets were therefore no longer accessible to Nigeria. The U.S. market was also no longer easily accessible to Nigerian exports due to insecurity in the seas and the limits on shipping space. Britain was afraid that the Nigerian cocoa industry might collapse, potentially leading to political and social chaos in the colony. Thus, it decided to buy the entire cocoa crop and was willing to incur losses if necessary.²³ At their inception, the marketing boards had the task of issuing licenses to private firms to purchase locally produced goods that they in turn would sell to the colonial government. Though originally intended to stabilize prices, the boards had unintended consequences. Over time, they evolved into a system of indirect taxation of agriculture, exploiting peasant farmers who were already living penurious lives. Toyin Falola notes that “The underpayment to the producers enabled the firms to make profits and the government to raise money to finance the war without raising taxes.”²⁴ This contradiction between intentions and outcomes is one that plagued development throughout the late colonial period. Though the colonial government intended to help the farmers during a time of economic crisis, the outcome of this policy change was the exploitation of the people the policy was intended to help in the first place.

The second significant change was the establishment in 1940 of a research system for studying export crops. Research had been an important component of British imperial development policy since the 1890s, with research centers studying crops and tropical diseases established both in the metropole and in the colonies. Carl Eicher observes that American scholarly research has ignored them, assuming that such centers were nonexistent before U.S. foundations helped launch the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center in Mexico and the International Rice Institute in the Philippines.²⁵

Before the Green Revolution of the 1970s, many European nations had successfully undertaken systematic scientific research efforts to improve agricultural production. At the turn of the twentieth century, "Several Central European states established plant-breeding stations whose express purpose was to make high-yielding plant varieties as well as the basic techniques of plant breeding available to the small farmers who predominated in those regions."²⁶ There were agricultural research centers in the British colonies prior to 1940. After 1940, these were substantially expanded with assistance from the Colonial Development & Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945.²⁷ Examples of such centers were the Cocoa Research Institute in Ghana, which was founded in 1938, and the Oil Palm Research Station in Nigeria founded in 1939. By 1951, these research institutes were expanded and new ones were established around West Africa, bringing the total to ten.

The third policy change undertaken by the British at this time was development planning. This was in direct response to the Great Depression that had pillaged both the metropolitan and colonial economies. The stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing economic crisis that resulted exposed the contradictions of British colonial rule. Though the Europeans had advanced colonial rule as a benevolent mission to civilize Africans, structural exploitation was at its core. The doctrine of financial self-sufficiency governed the relations between metropole and colony. This economic doctrine guaranteed that colonial people paid for their own exploitation through taxation. While revenues generated within the colonies were used to provide some essential and social services, the colonized were made to believe that these services were a result of the generous "mother country." With the colonial coffers drying up during the Great Depression, the colonial governments were unable to make the needed investments in public infrastructure and, more importantly, in social services. This unmasked the exploitative agenda of the colonial state, leading to social turmoil in the colonies. This unrest made the colonial powers the target of sharper criticisms within and outside the empire. Britain's response was the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. This legislation launched the era of a new developmentalist state, one this book refers to as the "Second Colonial Occupation." The legacy of this occupation, symbolized by the series of development acts passed by the British Parliament, has left a lasting legacy in Britain's former African colonies. After World War II, the 1940 Act was substantially enhanced in response to a growing decolonization movement and the need to give the empire a new lease of life.²⁸ Nigeria was one of the major beneficiaries of the development policies instituted by Britain during this late colonial occupation.

This book focuses on this third policy, examining the processes that resulted in the 1945 Nigerian Development Plan that was upheld as a model for other British territories in Africa. It also looks at the practice of

development in this period, focusing on the Niger Agriculture Development Scheme, Mokwa. This book argues that poor planning inspired by imperial ideologies is responsible for the failure of development in late colonial Africa. These imperial conceptualizations of development transitioned to the postcolonial period, continuing this legacy of failure, and leading Africa to often be defined by pathological stereotypes such as corruption, disease, war, and poverty, or what Dambisa Mboyo calls “The Four Horsemen of Africa’s Apocalypse.” This book challenges some of the narratives that are proffered for the crisis of development in Africa, particularly the problematic image of Africans as corrupt and irresponsible, as well as others, such as the view that Africa’s problems are caused by resistance to change on the part of the Africans, half-hearted commitment to development by the people, and Africa’s environment. *The Second Colonial Occupation* invites readers to consider the ideological and material interests that colonial powers and Western governments have in the continent that inform planning and implementation. By locating this study in the late colonial period, the book is a response to this question: If corruption and ineptitude of African leadership are responsible for the crisis of development in postcolonial Africa, why did development also fail in colonial Africa when Europeans were the architects and implementers of development policy? Nigeria is the focus of this study because it was the most populous British colony in Africa and had a unique colonial experience, in which three territories were amalgamated into one. Nigeria was also rich in primary agricultural products that were vital for the British industry and therefore successful development in the territory was in their interest. For these reasons, Nigeria was ahead of the other African colonies in drafting a development plan, and the documents originating from Nigeria were thoroughly discussed in London and advanced by the secretary of state for the colonies as a model for other British territories.

In examining Nigeria’s 1945 plan, the emphasis of this book is on the process that led to the plan documents. The practice of development as state intervention has been studied by social scientists, most notably modernization theorists. They have attempted to explain the success or failure of development in any given locality. Rather than attempting to study development by using some of the classical theories such as modernization, dependency, or world system theories, *The Second Colonial Occupation* historicizes development as a planning process. This approach, as Nick Cullather argues, conceives development as discourse and puts “the context, personalities, and politics back in.”²⁹ In historicizing development planning in late colonial Nigeria, this book situates the documents in the trajectory of official colonial thinking. Though not precluding a discussion on the implementation of plans, the focus of the book is on the painstaking process leading to the official documents. It shows the discourse and conflicts in Nigeria and the metropole,

as well as the negotiations that took place as attempts were made to craft a development plan for Nigeria.

By focusing on the development process, the book reveals how the historical debates on colonial development shaped the final plan document. One such debate that consumed the planning process was the question of whether metropolitan funds should be invested in the development of the colonies. Joseph Chamberlain had championed metropolitan investments in the colonies in the 1890s. Chamberlain's view was that of constructive exploitation. Rather than plundering the colonies without any investments in them, he wanted Britain to prime the resources of the colonies by making key investments. He argued that Britain, like a landlord of a great estate with abundant financial resources at its disposal, should invest in the colonies, opening them up for the extraction of resources.³⁰ For him, such investments should not be limited to the development of public infrastructure such as roads, rail, and ports but must be made equally in the area of scientific research. His imperial vision opened up a debate in London, one that continued into the 1920s. His imperial doctrine came up against the Treasury's historical position that colonies should be financially self-sufficient.

Although Chamberlain's ideas on metropolitan investments did not become the canon for Britain's relationship with its colonies, they continued to permeate the thinking at the colonial office (CO). Between 1890 and the economic crisis of the 1920s, rather than give free money to aid the development of the colonies, London guaranteed some development loans. Then, with Britain's economy in crisis and the resultant high unemployment, there was a gradual shift in London toward Chamberlain's vision. The result was the 1929 Colonial Development Act, a jobs program directed at helping the metropolitan economy. Casting the debate in these terms helped the passage of the 1929 Act. The Act's passage however did not end the ongoing debate in London over whether metropolitan funds should be used in the development of the colonies. The Treasury remained unconvinced and obstinate in their refusal. This debate recurred when Parliament debated the 1940 and 1945 Colonial Development and Welfare Acts. By this time, Chamberlain's vision of development had become the official thinking at the CO. These ideological debates helped to shape the outcome of the Development Acts as well as the plans that were introduced in light of them. Chamberlain's imperial vision shows us that ideas are important, even when they are not immediately implemented. The ideologies and debates surrounding such visions often live on to inform development trajectories.

By the 1940s, there was a major shift in Britain's development policy, with the metropole now willing to invest millions of pounds in the colonies. Treasury's question was no longer whether Britain should put money in the colonies but how much money and in what investments? By looking at the

planning process that resulted in the 1945 Nigerian plan, *The Second Colonial Occupation* provides a proper context for understanding the shifts and policy decisions that were made. Two important events provide the larger context for this plan: the Great Depression and World War II. The development discourse shows the efforts made by both London and Nigeria to expand production during the war, which had the two-pronged goal of supporting the war efforts and helping deal with Britain's postwar economy. At the end of the war, Britain's acute need to deal with its balance-of-payment problems forced it to emphasize the expansion of colonial production in its development policy. The agricultural bias of the development plan is a result of this context and is the reason that this book focuses on agricultural development.

Nigeria's 1945 plan shows the radical shift in colonial development policy in the 1940s. While the 1929 Colonial Development Act budgeted only £10 million for the development of the colonies, Nigeria's 1945 plan cost £55 million. This figure is staggering given that only £120 million was allocated for the development of all of British colonial holdings. Though only £23 million of this money was to be provided under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, it still shows the faith that Colonel Oliver Stanley and his colonial office had in the Nigerian plan. Given the number of investments that was to be made in Nigeria and the value of the territory to London, the Nigerian plan was marred in politicking that is only revealed when one pays close attention to the planning process. One key question in the planning process was: Who should control the development of the colonies? Nigerian officials wanted control over this process given that they had a better understanding of the local conditions, while some in the CO favored a metropolitan-centered approach where development was controlled from London. This political jockeying between Nigeria and London almost torpedoed the Nigerian plan. The plan was delayed until a compromise was reached: the creation of yet another bureaucratic structure in the CO to oversee development.

Such politicking was not limited to the interactions between London and Nigeria. There were internal debates in Nigeria, between the political/administrative wing and the technical departments of the colonial state, over who should control local development. Some of these conflicts escalated into personal conflicts. One notable example was the conflict between the director of the agriculture department, Captain James Mackie, and the governor of Nigeria, Sir Arthur Richards. The governor wrestled power from the department and placed it in the hands of political officials. The escalation of the conflict forced Mackie to resign from Nigeria's agriculture department before the final approval of the agricultural plan that he had written. These kinds of conflicts expose the human side of development that are not always apparent in the plan documents themselves. This book reveals how these human elements in the planning process had an impact on the outcomes.

Focusing primarily on the planning process offers us a new perspective from which to look at the failure of development in Africa. Plenty of studies have explored the implementation of development plans or policies. These studies are insufficient to understanding this crisis. Planning is as important as implementation and poor planning inevitably leads to poor implementation and outcomes. Development plans in Africa are often designed or guided by international experts who are convinced that they know what Africa needs and how to achieve it. It is not surprising that when these plans fail, Africans are often blamed. Scholars associated with Western universities and think tanks have corroborating studies to support their deeply inaccurate notions about Africans and to justify the belief that Africans are to blame for the failures. Most of these studies focus on development in the postcolonial era and erroneously assume that Africans are in control of the development machinery during this period. Though political leadership is vested in the hands of Africans, the control of the economy and resources is still guided by the invisible hand of Euro-American states and institutions such as the World Bank/ IMF. For example, after independence in 1960, the Nigerian government launched six development plans that mirrored the 1945 colonial plan; in some cases the newer plans expanded upon the projects that were established by the 1945 plan. Because of this, it is important to consider the legacy of the plans developed by the British when judging the success or failure of those made postindependence, which shared many of the same principles. For this reason, rather than studying the postcolonial period, this book returns to the late colonial era to show that even when development was under the management of Europeans, it failed. The Niger Agriculture Development Scheme, Mokwa (NAP) in Nigeria is used as a case study to show how poor planning in the colonial era led to bad outcomes. This scheme is emblematic of other development projects in Nigeria and colonial Africa in the postwar period. By investigating this late colonial period, *The Second Colonial Occupation* will provide insights toward understanding postcolonial development.

In understanding the problems of development in Africa, we need to stop blaming Africans who are already victims of a world economic system that is historically exploitative and rigged against them. As Jeremiah Dibia has argued, the modernization paradigm plays a central role in the creation and perpetuation of the crisis of development in Africa. He does not discount Africa's internal problems such as corruption, ineptitude, authoritarianism, and the patrimonial nature of some states. However, these are not the primary causes of the crisis. The crisis is rooted in the attempt to export and plant Western modernization models or paradigms in places where the sociocultural realities are different from in the West. For Dibia, the reason for the failure of modernization-inspired programs in Africa is the paradigm itself and not Africa's internal problems.³¹ He argues that development planning in

Nigeria, as evidenced in the 1962 plan and beyond, was a product of “Eurocentric diffusionism through modernization, which only attributes history to European societies while denying history or any form of meaningful autonomous development to African societies, fostered ethnocentrism and false universalism that negatively affected development planning in Nigeria.”³² This is the reason that development programs for Africa are often designed by expatriates with little or no input by Africans, with locally produced knowledge often rejected in favor of “imported” knowledge.

Nigeria’s 1945 plan has not received the scholarly attention that it deserves because of the argument that it is not an actual development plan. In his *Foundations of an African Economy: A Study of Investment and Growth in Nigeria*, Ojetunji Aboyade studies the history of the Nigerian economy, measuring its growth and identifying the economic problems that are responsible for Nigeria’s underdevelopment. Paying close attention to the Nigerian context, he offers a new direction for development planning. Nevertheless, Aboyade argues that the 1945 ten-year development plan instituted by the British in the late colonial period cannot be properly called a development plan, describing it instead as “more a catalogue of little interrelated proposals with ill-defined goals and no coherent statement of policy.”³³ This argument is one that has been repeated by other nationalist economists who argue that the 1945 plan did not have any systematic model or guiding principle, but was rather an amalgam of different projects or schemes that became a plan.³⁴ *The Second Colonial Occupation* argues that the 1945 ten-year development plan was an actual plan. Careful thought and deliberation went into designing it. Several committees at the local and national level in the colony, and many other committees at the metropole, discussed, debated, and analyzed the ideas that would become the plan. To dismiss this plan is to also dismiss the postcolonial plans, which were built upon its foundation.

Another argument used to dismiss the 1945 plan is that development was invented after World War II. This view results in the incorrect assertion that plans designed in the early 1940s and implemented from early 1945, like the Nigerian plan, cannot be said to be development plans because development had not yet been invented. Adherents of this view have argued that the practice and theory of development arose when President Harry Truman, in his January 20, 1949 speech, announced his “fair deal” and set forth a doctrine that offered a new way of understanding world affairs. The transfer of global power from Britain and France to the U.S. following the war launched the American century in which that nation became more assertive in world affairs. American social scientists propagated a new style of development called modernization, which was financed by U.S. government and foundations. Nils Gilman notes that modernization was an invention of the U.S. in response to postwar challenges and opportunities.³⁵ His argument misses the

fact that what was sold as “modernization” was merely theory. In practice, modernization was no different from development policy practiced under the British and the French. While Arturo Escobar does not see Truman’s speech as solely responsible for the creation of development, he argues that it was invented in the postwar period by the West as an instrument for the exportation of Western moral and cultural superiority to the “Third World”: the imposition of Western knowledge and ideas upon these people whom the West treated as “a child in need of adult guidance.”³⁶ Like Gilman, Escobar’s argument fails to account for British and French development policy in Africa prior to the war. David Ekbladh challenges the view that modernization is a postwar invention and pushes the origins of modernization to the prewar period. He argues that there were emerging new ideas of development in the 1910s and 1920s that coupled modern applied technologies with the new social sciences. Though these ideas originated from outside the U.S., they had strong adherents in America.³⁷ Ekbladh ties development to the ideological struggles of the twentieth century: Liberalism, Communism, and Fascism. The intervention by the U.S. in world affairs was part of an ideological struggle over whose “ideologies were best suited to deliver the benefits of modern life.”³⁸ The ideas that would later be termed as modernization were not 1945 inventions; neither was modernization theory created by the Cold War. Rather, these preexisting ideas worked their way into Cold War policies.³⁹ *The Second Colonial Occupation* shows that there was continuity between British-led colonial development and American-led modernization.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

The Second Colonial Occupation is laid out in five chapters. The first chapter looks at the early years of British colonial development. It begins with Joseph Chamberlain’s call for Britain to invest its resources in the colonies, with the goal of extracting the resources of the colonial people. The chapter discusses Chamberlain’s doctrine of constructive imperialism and reveals how its primary goal was the exploitation of Africa. Chamberlain’s call for Britain to use public funds to invest in public infrastructure and scientific research placed him ahead of his time. The prevalent belief was that private capital, and not government funds, should be used in the development of the colonies. Chamberlain faced fierce opposition from the Treasury. This chapter shows that though Chamberlain did not see his vision actualized, he laid an important ideological foundation within the CO and this thinking later influenced colonial development policy as Britain struggled with the economic slump of the 1920s and rising unemployment. In the 1920s, L. S. Amery, who was the parliamentary undersecretary of state for the colonies, and Lord

Milner, who was the secretary of state for the colonies, embraced the vision of Chamberlain and attempted to institutionalize colonial development. By returning to the 1890s, the chapter helps us to better situate the historical roots of the debates that the CO and the Treasury had over the development acts. It enables us also to see how London's thinking on colonial development shifted over time. By examining this earlier period, the chapter shows that implementation alone cannot be the primary vehicle for assessing the trajectory of development. Ideology is very important.

The second chapter explores the debates leading to the passage of Nigeria's 1945 development plan. The Nigerian administration was eager to produce a development plan and thus created new institutions to aid this process. It was through these bureaucratic institutions and thoughtful discussions in Nigeria that the first blueprints for a ten-year development proposal were produced. This chapter will also analyze those discussions and ideological debates that took place in London and in Nigeria leading to the 1945 plan. Examining such debates is important as it exposes the hidden effects of the planning process on development policies. Nigerian colonial officials were well intentioned in their efforts to develop the colony. Despite the strengths of the plan that was produced by Nigeria, this chapter argues that it had limitations and shortcomings. One of the primary problems the plan faced was insufficient financial investments to carry out the kind of development that was envisaged. The plan was also affected by the systemic racism of the colonial state, which excluded Nigerians from playing an active role in the design of the plan.

The 1945 development plan also reflected an agrarian bias. The colonial state relied on revenues from agriculture to finance development in the colony and thus was attempting to frontload most of the grants it received from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund toward expanding agricultural production. Agriculture was seen as the path to Nigeria's economic prosperity. Therefore, in the third chapter, the focus is on the agriculture plan. This plan was the creation of Captain James Richard Mackie, the most influential director of agriculture in colonial Nigeria. Mackie served in the agriculture department of Nigeria for twenty-four years before he retired in February 1945. Mackie's policy of agricultural development emphasized careful research and field trials before farmers were asked to change their methods of farming. Mackie's policy was too cautious and conservative and it also failed to change the social and political systems that were associated with African farming. Like colonial rule itself, Mackie's policy was blinded by the color line, as it failed to incorporate the farmers' local knowledge. The chapter also examines the conflicts between the agriculture department and the political department of the colonial state for local control over development. This chapter shows how process is important to understanding the success or failure of development plans.

In the period after the war, there was a shift in the agricultural policy that was instituted by Mackie in Nigeria. This shift occurred because of the Sterling Crisis in London and the policies of the new Labour government. The Mackiean policy of careful experimentation and field trials was abandoned for a more rapid policy of agriculture that ended up becoming an expensive social experiment in modern agriculture. The fourth chapter of the book focuses on a specific scheme, the Niger Agricultural Scheme, Mokwa. The scheme is analyzed and some of the problems that plagued it are identified. This scheme failed because of poor planning. The scheme offers an excellent example of the practice of development and the ramifications of poor planning.

The legacies of British colonial rule in Nigeria are discussed in the fifth chapter. While the overarching legacy of colonial rule is colonial mentalité, in terms of development planning there are three specific legacies: multiyear centralized planning, agrarian bias, and a reliance on international experts for development.

The question why there were regressive changes in my neighborhood in Nigeria is addressed in the conclusion. The changes were a result of the IMF/World Bank–imposed Structural Adjustments Programs of the 1980s. Africa’s crisis of development does not exist in a vacuum. History, geopolitics, and economics are important. This book reveals that in development, process and context matters and we better pay attention to it when we are planning or implementing development policy.

NOTES

1. The European traders did not venture beyond the seaports into the interior parts of Nigeria. They relied on their business partners in Nigeria to bring goods from the interior to them.

2. Philip Ehrensaf, “The Political Economy of Informal Empire in Pre-Colonial Nigeria, 1807–1884,” *Canadian Journal of African studies* 6, 3 (1972): 456

3. Michael Crowder, *A Short History of Nigeria* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 233.

4. Great Britain. Colonial office, *Committee on Improved and Increased Production of Palm Oil and Palm Kernels in West Africa*. (London: HM Stationery Office, 1925), 10.

5. R. Olufemi Ekundare, *An Economic History of Nigeria 1860–1960* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1973), 166.

6. *Ibid.*, 168.

7. Bade Onimode, *Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria: The Dialectics of Mass Poverty* (London: Zed Press, 1982), 46.

8. *Ibid.*, 44.

9. Ekundare, *An Economic History of Nigeria*, 168.
10. The term “peasants” here refers to smallholder farmers who cultivated for their own consumption and for the markets. Their production was always small scale and relied mainly on family or communal labor. A small number of peasants retained paid labor but this was never at the scale of industrial agriculture. This word “peasants” has negative connotations. It is used because it captures the demeaning attitude of the colonial rulers toward the African farmers.
11. The “dual mandate,” a phrase coined by Lord Lugard, one of British colonial governors in Africa, captures British imperialism in Africa. It is an imperial principle that the resources of the colony should be exploited for the benefits of metropole and colony.
12. Ekundare, *An Economic History of Nigeria*, 158.
13. Anne Phillips, *The Enigma of Colonialism: British Policy in West Africa* (Bloomington, In: Indiana University Press, 1989), 3.
14. *Ibid.*, 11.
15. *Ibid.*, 11–12.
16. The colonial state was not as powerful as it is sometimes purported to be. Fred Cooper argues that “the much celebrated policy of ‘indirect rule’ in British Africa . . . represented an attempt to make retreat sound like policy.” See Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 11. On how African labor undermined the authority of chiefs and white administrators in Kenya, see Bruce Berman, *Control & Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1999), 61.
17. See Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, *Doctrines of Development* (New York: Routledge, 1996).
18. Cowen and Shenton, *Doctrines of Development*, 7.
19. This was a concept coined by Low and Lonsdale to describe the expansive development policies introduced by the British after World War II. Massive projects were carried out in the field of agriculture, with the intention of holding onto the colonies while at the same time boosting Britain’s economy. See, D.A. Low and J.M. Lonsdale, “Introduction: Towards the New Order, 1945–63,” in *History of East Africa vol. 3*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). The title of this book is derived from this coinage by Low and Lonsdale.
20. John Maynard Keynes argued that the solution to the problem of the Great Depression was to stimulate the economy by cutting interest rates and government investment in infrastructure. Ochonu argued that, rather than the colonial state investing in infrastructure, they cut public investment.
21. Moses E. Ochonu, *Colonial Meltdown: Northern Nigeria in the Great Depression* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009), 28–29.
22. Carl K. Eicher, “The Dynamics of Long-Term Agricultural Development in Nigeria,” *Journal of Farm Economics* 49, 5 (1967): 1161.
23. Toyin Falola, *Economic Reforms and Modernization in Nigeria, 1945–1965* (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 2004), 79.
24. *Ibid.*, 21.

25. Eicher, "The Dynamics of Long-Term Agricultural Development in Nigeria," 1162.
26. Jonathan Harwood, *Europe's Green Revolution and its Successors: The Rise and Fall of Peasant-Friendly Plant Breeding* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 2.
27. Hereafter, CD&W Act.
28. More details on these acts are provided in the second chapter.
29. Nick Cullather, Development? It's History, *Diplomatic History*, 24, 4 (2000): 648.
30. Joseph Chamberlain, "Speech at Walsall," July 15, 1895, in Joseph Morgan Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism*, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 21.
31. Jeremiah I. Dibua, *Modernization and the Crisis of Development in Africa: The Nigerian Experience* (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 19, 27.
32. Jeremiah I. Dibua, *Development and Diffusionism: Looking beyond Neopatriotism in Nigeria, 1962–1985* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), xii.
33. Ojetunji Aboyade, *Foundations of an African Economy: A Study of Investment and Growth in Nigeria* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 150.
34. Pius Okigbo, *National Development Planning in Nigeria, 1900–1992* (London: James Currey, 1989), 154. Edward Ayo also makes the argument that this plan is hardly a development plan in any serious sense. Like Aboyade and Okigbo, he argues that it was just a list of projects. See, Edward Jide Ayo, *Development Planning in Nigeria* (Ibadan: University Press Limited, 1988), 2.
35. Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003), 61.
36. Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 4&30. For more on this argument see also Gilbert Rist, *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith* (London: Zed Books, 1997).
37. David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization & the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 7.
38. *Ibid.*, 2.
39. *Ibid.*, 4. For more on prewar modernization origins, see Michael Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 4–5.